Summary of Rodriguez v. District Court, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 14 by Hernandez, Rami
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
1-1-2004
Summary of Rodriguez v. District Court, 128 Nev.
Adv. Op. 14
Rami Hernandez
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Law Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hernandez, Rami, "Summary of Rodriguez v. District Court, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 14" (2004). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper
697.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/697
 1
Rodriguez v. District Court, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87 
102 P.3d 41 (2004)1 
 
Domestic Relations– Child Support, Contempt for Non-Payment of Child Support 
 
Summary 
 
 Petitioner Charles Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and the real party in interest, Nicole Eddowes 
(Eddowes), divorced in November 2001.  The terms of the initial custody order and divorce 
decree awarded primary physical custody of the couple’s daughter to Eddowes and ordered 
Rodriguez to pay child support, half of the child’s insurance premiums, and half of any 
unreimbursed medical expenses incurred on the child’s behalf.   
 Rodriguez failed to make payments as required, and on March 1, 2004, the district court 
issued its third contempt order against Rodriguez for the non-payment of child support.  The 
district court denied Rodriguez’s assertion that he was an indigent defendant and entitled to 
appointed counsel in the contempt proceedings because of the possibility of jail.  The court 
ordered Rodriguez to serve twenty-five days in jail, with the possibility of early release upon 
payment of $10,000 in outstanding arrearages.  
 Rodriguez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the district court order 
denying him counsel, holding him in contempt, and sentencing him to jail.  The Nevada Supreme 
Court ordered a temporary stay pending review.   
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
apply in civil contempt proceedings.  However, due process requires the trial court to evaluate 
the need for appointing counsel on a case-by-case basis.  The court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a determination of whether Rodriguez was indigent for purposes of determining 
whether he was entitled to the appointment of counsel. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
 
 Is an indigent defendant in family court entitled to appointed counsel in a contempt 
hearing when the hearing may result in the imposition of a jail sentence for nonpayment of child 
support? 
 
Disposition 
 
 Possibly.  The need for appointed counsel turns on an initial determination of indigency.  
If an indigent party faces the threat of possible incarceration for the nonpayment of child support, 
the court should then seek to balance the private liberty interest at stake, the government’s 
interest, and the risk of erroneous finding, taking into account the complexity of the legal and 
factual issues as well as the party’s ability to effectively communicate on his own behalf. 
 
 
                                                 
1 By Beth Rosenblum. 
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Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Rodriguez 
 
 The issue presented in Rodriguez is one of first impression in Nevada.  Other 
jurisdictions have adopted three approaches to determine whether an indigent defendant is 
entitled to counsel in contempt proceedings involving the non-payment of child support that may 
result in a jail sentence. 
 
Other Jurisdictions – Absolute Right to Appointed Counsel 
 
 Courts taking this view do not distinguish between civil and criminal contempt 
proceedings, and instead rely on a finding of indigency as the critical factor in the analysis. For 
instance, the Tenth Circuit in Walker v. McClain held that due process required the appointment 
of counsel for defendants in hearings for non-payment of child support when those defendants 
establish indigency.2  The Court of Appeals stated that the right to counsel turns on whether the 
proceeding results in a deprivation of liberty, regardless of whether it is characterized as civil or 
criminal.3  Other courts that follow this reasoning have determined that the risk that an indigent 
defendant could be jailed erroneously if not provided with counsel outweighs any government 
interests, particularly in light of other alternatives to compel compliance with child support 
orders such as income withholding or property liens.4 
 
Other Jurisdictions – No Right to Appointed Counsel 
 
 Courts following this view have determined that there are no circumstances under which 
a parent is entitled to court-appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay 
child support.  These courts have reasoned that a party cannot be found guilty of failing to pay 
child support and sentenced to jail because if the parent is indigent, the trial court cannot make 
the essential finding needed for contempt: that the parent has the ability to pay and has willfully 
refused to do so.  Thus, there is no threat of imprisonment.  Accordingly, the Florida Supreme 
Court in Andrews v. Walton determined that a father who had the ability to pay his support 
obligation but willfully refused to do so was not denied his due process rights when the trial 
court ordered incarceration without appointing counsel.5  
 
Other Jurisdictions – Discretionary Appointment of Counsel 
 
 Courts subscribing to this approach have held that due process does not require the 
appointment of counsel every time an indigent party faces the possibility of imprisonment for 
civil contempt due to the nonpayment of child support.  In Department of Human Services v. 
Rael, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case analysis, providing discretion to 
the trial court to determine whether fundamental fairness required the appointment of counsel in 
                                                 
2 Walker v. McClain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1985). 
3 Id. at 1183. 
4 E.g., Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Mich. 1990). 
5 Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663, 665-66 (Fla. 1983). 
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any given case.6  The court stated that the trial court should consider relevant factors such as the 
party’s ability to understand the proceeding, the complexity of the issues, and the defenses that 
might be presented.7  
 
Effect of the Decision on Current Law 
 
 The decision in Rodriguez gives trial courts the discretion to consider whether or not 
counsel should be appointed to an indigent parent in a contempt hearing for nonpayment of child 
support.  Trial courts will have to follow the three-part balancing test enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether the interests of due process 
have been met in these cases.8  This test requires a review of the private interests at stake, the 
government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decision.9  
After balancing these elements, trial courts must measure them as a whole against the 
presumption that a right to appointed counsel arises only when the indigent defendant may lose 
his personal freedom.10 
 The decision is also consistent with Nevada’s approach to appointing counsel in other 
civil cases.  In civil litigation, courts engage in a balancing test by looking to a party’s current 
financial status.11  Courts balance income and assets against debts and liabilities to determine 
that whether that party is indigent for purposes of appointing counsel.12    
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
 The court in Rodriguez fails to address concerns about the risk of punitive confinement 
facing defendants in non-support contempt proceedings.  Trial courts may sense that the failure 
to obey past orders for child support offends the dignity of the court, creating a strong impetus 
toward punitive sentencing.13  Courts may also believe that they are authorized to impose 
sentences on parents with little means to pay in order to motivate them to greater diligence in the 
future.14  The purpose is punitive, as deterrence is one of the goals of punishment.15  Moreover, 
the court does not address the argument that putting a father in jail for an extended stay may be 
counterproductive to the ultimate goal of coercing his payment of child support.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the Nevada Supreme Court adopts a balancing approach, its decision in 
Rodriguez reflects the rationale of the Florida Supreme Court and other courts that will not 
appoint counsel in contempt hearings for non-payment of child support.  The court acknowledges 
                                                 
6 Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 1103 (N.M. 1982). 
7 Id. at 1104. 
8 Mathews v. Eldridge, 452 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
9 Id. 
10 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
11 NEV. REV. STAT. 12.015; see Nikander v. Dist. Ct. in & for First Judicial Dist., 711 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo. 1986).  
12 Nikander, 711 P.2d at 1262. 
13 Robert Monk, The Indigent Defendant’s Right to Court-Appointed Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings for 
Nonpayment of Child Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 326, 340 (1983). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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that Rodriguez would not be found indigent and thus entitled to counsel if he were willfully 
unemployed, as declared by the trial court.  Accordingly, there would be no threat of a due 
process violation because an indigent party cannot be imprisoned.  It is unlikely, then, that 
defendants like Rodriguez will receive counsel.  Still, because the decision at least leaves open 
the possibility that defendants may receive assistance of counsel, the court properly complied 
with the requirements of due process. 
